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Bajo el título genérico La transformación de la política en Europa se desarrolló  la primera 
Lección Magistral de la London School of Economics (LSE) de 2015. Simon Hix examinó 
el marco político dominante, el comportamiento del cambio político dentro de la Unión 
Europea y los posibles resultados futuros. El segundo día de la clase magistral se centró 
en los resultados de las elecciones en Reino Unido del 7 de mayo y en los impactos 
tanto para el panorama político en Reino Unido como para la UE. En el último día se 
analizó la comunicación política, mirando cómo ha cambiado en los últimos años con 
la aparición de los medios digitales y el impacto en el panorama político.
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The EU is a remarkable achievement. This 
might seem an odd claim to make in the midst 
of the Eurozone debt crisis and with Europe’s 
declining global signifi cance.  Yet, over the 
last 60 years we have built a unique architec-
ture to create and govern a continental-scale 
polity.  From a broad historical and global 
perspective this achievement should not be 
underestimated.
On the economic side, the EU has achieved 
the free movement of goods, services, capital 
and labour within a market of almost 500 mi-
llion people.  Meanwhile, on the political side, 
the EU has developed a multi-level system of 
government with multiple checks and balanc-
es, which enables Europe’s elected leaders to 
make decisions about market regulation at 
the European level while maintaining power 
over taxation and spending at the national 
level. This architecture has become a model 
for other regions of the world, such as South 
America and East Asia, who are trying to 
establish their own single markets.  
In response, some Eurosceptics would no 
doubt argue that global economic integration 
could be a substitute for European economic 
integration. Who needs a continental-scale 
market in Europe if a global market could pro-
vide even greater economies of scale?  Such 
claims are delusional. The fundamental dif-
ference between the EU and global economic 
integration is on the political side. Without 
far more convergence on social and political 
values on a global scale, a world community 
will not be able to adopt market creating and 
correcting measures necessary for a single 
market to function. For example, agreement 
on basic carbon emissions standards and 
core labour standards is extremely diffi cult, 
and global standards on the equal treatment 
of men and women in the workplace are vir-
tually unthinkable. As a result, it is unlikely 
that global economic integration will develop 
beyond the removal of trade barriers in a sub-
set of goods and services. Economic integra-
tion in Europe is of a wholly different magni-
tude, and the benefi ts of this greater degree of 
economic integration have only been possible 
because European citizens share some basic 
values about how economic and social rela-
tions should be organised and regulated.
Nonetheless, now that the basic architecture 
of the EU has been in place through succes-
sive treaties over the last 25 years, the EU is 
at a crossroads. The EU faces several funda-
mental policy and political challenges.  On the 
policy side, fi rst and foremost is the fi nancial 
crisis in the Eurozone. Other policy challen-
ges include Europe’s energy market and how 
to overcome our energy dependency on out-
side states.  Europe’s economy needs further 
structural reform, to increase our global com-
petitiveness.  Europe needs a more effective 
climate change policy. The free movement of 
persons is under threat from fears of an infl ux 
of migrants from the confl icts in North Afri-
ca and the Middle East. And, Europe needs 
to better protect its interests and project its 
values on the world stage.  
On the political side, the main challenge is 
leadership. Who is in charge? Merkel and 
Sarkozy are trying to take a lead on the Eu-
Some Eurosceptics would no doubt argue that global 
economic integration could be a substitute for European 
economic integration
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rozone crisis. But, in an EU of 27 member 
states, Germany and France no longer have 
the legitimacy they had in the EU of 6 or even 
12 countries. And, where is the Commission? 
The creation of the single market and the Euro 
was the apogee of the Commission’s powers. 
Since Jacques Delors the Commission has 
been absent from major policy debates and 
has become marginalised in the making of EU 
legislation, as the key issues are now resolved 
between the European Parliament and the 
Council. 
Crisis and collapse
So, where will these challenges lead?  Are the 
achievements of the last half century under 
serious threat?  Here are four possible scenar-
ios of what might happen in the next decade.
First up is crisis and collapse. In this sce-
nario, the current crisis is exacerbated when 
Greece eventually defaults on its public debt, 
perhaps followed by Italy and/or Spain. The 
reason for the defaults would probably be 
growing opposition to ‘bailouts’ amongst the 
publics of several northern states, such as 
Finland, the Netherlands and Germany. Reac-
ting to these sentiments, the fi nancial markets 
might then force Greece and perhaps also 
Portugal out of the Euro (although leaving the 
Euro would risk massive capital fl ight as busi-
nesses and families try to keep their savings 
in Euros rather than have them converted 
into a new currency).  
Provoked by the crisis in the Eurozone, the 
United Kingdom government might then seek 
to renegotiate our relationship with the EU, 
and demand a blanket opt-out of EU social 
and labour market regulations in the single 
market.  An acrimonious debate would ensue, 
whereby several other states would demand 
tariffs on British imports unless British fi rms 
apply the common rules.
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The impasse would then be resolved by an 
agreement on a “new EU”. This new EU 
would involve a core group of states, ba-
sed around France, Germany, the Benelux, 
Austria and perhaps some central and East-
ern European states, who have the Euro, 
full free movement of persons, full access 
to the single market and the full acquis of 
EU rules and regulations, and a periphery 
group of states who have various bi-lateral 
arrangements with the core to gain ac-
cess to the EU single market in return for 
applying some minimum EU standards. 
In this scenario, the United Kingdom, and 
perhaps Greece and Portugal, Denmark 
and Sweden, would join Switzerland and 
Norway on the EU periphery.
How likely is this scenario?  I would not give 
it more than a 20 per cent probability. The 
EU has proven to be pretty resilient. And 
it is easy in the midst of a crisis to ignore 
the fact that the alternatives to the EU single 
market and the Euro are not very palatable for 
most states.  Britain, for example, which has 
a large proportion of trade with non-EU states, 
has more than 55 per cent of its total trade 
in goods and services with the other 26 EU 
states, and this trade constitutes more than 20 
per cent of British GDP.  If Britain decided to
renegotiate its relationship with the EU, or 
even to leave the EU, it is highly unlikely that 
the remaining EU states would grant Britain 
full access to the single market.  They would 
assume that one of the main reasons Britain 
would want to opt-out or leave would be to 
avoid EU social and labour market regula-
tions, which increase business costs. But why 
would the rest of the EU allow British export-
ers to undercut goods and service providers 
inside the single market who would still have 
to apply the standards? The continental-scale 
market is only viable because everyone ac-
cepts the basic minimum rules. If Britain 
ended up on the periphery of the EU, British 
goods and service providers would invariable 
face new non-tariff barriers 
in the single market. After 
all, Britain is not Switzer-
land and Norway.  These 
two states are not in the EU 
but are allowed almost full 
access to the single mar-
ket only because they have 
higher production costs and higher social and 
environmental standards than the EU average.
Fiscal Union
The second potential scenario is fi scal 
union. In this scenario, as bond yields sky-
On the political side, the main 
challenge is leadership. Who is in 
charge?
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rocket in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, 
the EU decides to establish a genuine fi scal 
union. This would involve a new central fi nan-
cial resource, for purchasing bonds of Euro-
zone member states, as well as the establish-
ment of EU bonds, issued by the European 
Central Bank. But, in return for this major 
step on the road to fi scal federalism, which 
effectively means bailing out several Euro-
zone states, Germany, Finland, the Nether-
lands, France and the other contributors to 
the fund would demand common EU rules 
on minimum taxation levels, public pensions 
provisions (including retirement ages), and 
EU oversight of national taxing and spending 
policies.  In one sense, this would be the logi-
cal next step in Bela Balassa’s teleological vi-
sion of economic integration from the 1960s, 
where a single market naturally follows from 
a free trade area, a single currency follows 
from a single market, and a fi scal union fo-
llows from a single currency.
The basic elements of this union are already 
on the table. The EU already has the Finan-
cial Stability Mechanism, which was set up 
to support Greece and has been increased 
as the debt crisis has spread.  Germany and 
France have already proposed a new set of 
common commitments for managing pu-
blic fi nances inside the Eurozone, in an at-
tempt to prevent states fi nding themselves 
in a similar situation in the future.
However, genuine fi scal union is something 
fundamentally different to these recent ini-
tiatives and more akin to fi scal federalism 
in the United States or Germany, where 
the central federal budget is used to make 
massive transfers between states in times 
of economic crisis. Genuine fi scal union 
in the EU would require the EU to have 
a much larger budget, well above the cu-
rrent 1 per cent of EU GDP.  For example, 
in the mid 1970s, a report for the Commis-
sion on how to set up a single currency 
recom-mended that the EU budget should be 
increased to at least 5 per cent of EU GDP for 
a single currency to be sustainable. 
And the size of the public funds that would 
need to be pooled in a fi scal union is the rea-
son why this scenario has a relatively low pro-
bability of happening, probably around 10 per 
cent. In a time of fi scal austerity, a majority 
of taxpayers in Germany, France, Finland, the 
Netherlands, and Austria would rather see the 
Euro collapse than allow a huge proportion of 
their national budgets to be handed over to 
the EU to stabilise the currency. The EU does 
not have the legitimacy for such a major trans-
fer of resources. A fi scal union would also 
have to overcome a challenge in the German 
Constitutional Court, which would almost cer-
tainly rule that a fi scal union would require 
changing the German constitution and the EU 
treaties to explicitly allow such a transfer of 
sovereignty.  Finally, and above all, citizens 
in the states receiving the funds are unlikely 
to support handing over power to Brussels to 

























govern their domestic tax systems, pensions 
systems, and so on.
Supersized Switzerland scenario
A far more likely scenario is that the EU will 
muddle through the crisis, as it always seems 
to. I call this the Supersized Switzerland 
scenario. Why Switzerland? Well, like Switz-
erland, where the Prime Minister rotates 
between the parties, the EU is has no identi-
fi able leader. Van Rompuy is President of the 
European Council, Barroso is President of 
the Commission, and the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers still rotates every six 
months between the member states. Also like 
Switzerland, EU decision-making is slow and 
consensual rather than quick and decisive. 
And, like Switzerland, the EU may be a rather 
nice place to live and work, but is increasing-
ly an ‘outdoor museum’ for American and 
Asian tourists and decreasingly relevant on 
the global stage. That’s not all. Just as there is 
growing opposition to consensus and gridlock 
in Switzerland and increasing antipathy to Is-
lam, there is growing anti-EU sentiment and 
opposition to foreigners throughout the EU. 
Sedate irrelevance might be fi ne for a small 
wealthy country in the middle of Europe, but 
it’s not much fun for a continent of half a bi-
llion people!
Having said that, this scenario is probably 
the most likely, with a 50 per cent probability. 
The reason is because any change in the EU 
– such as reorganising the EU into a core and 
a periphery or taking a major step forward to 
fi scal union– is very diffi cult. Such changes 
would require all 27 member states to agree, 
and then be ratifi ed by national parliaments 
and in referendums in several countries. We 
saw how diffi cult it was to ratify the Lisbon 
Treaty, which in hindsight was far less signi-
fi cant than either the 1986 Single European 
Act, or the subsequent treaties agreed in 
Maastricht and Amsterdam. Hence, fi nding 
some way of muddling through the crisis is 
probably what the EU will do. This would 
probably involve some small elements of 
fi scal union, building on the Financial Stabil-
ity Mechanism, and some further efforts to 
harmonise national fi scal policies within the 
Eurozone and for collectively monitoring na-
tional fi scal policies. 
This scenario would be less of a problem for 
Britain than the full fi scal union scenario. Es-
tablishing a fi scal union between the members 
of the Eurozone would inevitably mean rele-
gating Britain to the second tier. In the short 
term this might not cause too many problems 
for Britain, as the Eurozone states would fo-
cus on a larger crisis fund and some common 
rules for national fi scal policies. In the longer 
term, however, a fi scal union would involve 
harmonized minimum corporate tax rates and 
even marginal rates of personal taxation. This 
would inevitable cause confl icts between Eu-
rozone states, who would have to harmonize 
rates, and states outside the Eurozone, who 
could apply lower rates and so undercut the 
Eurozone. In the end, a fi scal union within the 
Eurozone might be a slippery slope to a two-
tier EU, along the lines of the fi rst scenario. 
Hence, a more informal and less ambitious 
set of policies along the lines of a Supersized 
Switzerland is less likely to put Britain in the 
invidious position of choosing between sig-
ning up to fi scal union or being relegated to 
the second division in Europe.
Emerging democratic politics
Finally, however, there is a more optimistic 
scenario for progressives in Europe, which I 
call emerging democratic politics in Brus-
sels.  In this scenario, something new happens 
in the June 2014 European Parliament elec-
tions: rival candidates for the Commission 
Presidency are declared before the elections. 
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This might seem a rather trivial change to 
the way European elections currently work, 
where the Commission President is currently 
proposed by the heads of government and ra-
tifi ed by a majority of MEPs in a newly elected 
European Parliament.  On the contrary, rival 
candidates for the most powerful executive 
offi ce in the EU could start to transform the 
way EU politics works.  
Some elements of this scenario have already 
started to happen. José Barroso will stand 
down at the end of his second term in 2014. 
The centre-right European People’s Party 
(EPP), to which Barroso belongs, have al-
ready announced that they will propose a 
candidate to succeed him, probably from 
amongst the group of sitting EPP prime mi-
nisters. In response, the centre-left the Party 
of European Socialists (PES) has announced 
that they too will propose a candidate for the 
post. The liberals, greens, radical left, and 
perhaps even anti-EU parties will no doubt 
propose their own candidates.
With several names on the table in 2014 there 
will be a European focus to the European Par-
liament election campaign for the fi rst time. 
These elections are usually fought as mid-
term national contests on the performance of 
national governments and national party lea-
ders rather than on EU issues, or candidates 
for the European Commission, or ideas about 
the direction of the EU policy agenda. This 
might change if there is a battle for the Com-
mission Presidency.  
EU politics is currently largely ignored by 
political editors of newspapers and TV news 
programme. This is for understandable rea-
sons, since newspapers and TV news are 
fi ghting for space in highly competitive media 
markets, and so have no incentive to allo-
cate valuable space to EU politics when there 
is enough material to fi le their pages or min-
utes from their domestic ‘political soap oper-
as’. News media need political personalities 
and identifi able winners and losers, so they 
can provide infortainment: who is up, who 

























is down, who is clever, who is stupid, and so 
on. A campaign for the Commission President 
would provide editors with the content of a 
European level political soap opera for the 
fi rst time. The candidates would no doubt is-
sue their own “manifestos”, setting out what 
they plan to do in their fi ve-year term. There 
would also probably be a live TV debate, hos-
ted by the European Parliament, with strea-
ming video on the internet and images for 
newspapers and news channels. There would 
be ample material for the media, who would 
compete for interviews with the key candi-
dates, and over attempts praise or poke fun 
at the leading personalities.  Quality newspa-
pers, such as The Financial Times, The Guar-
dian and the The Times, would no doubt take 
a lead in reporting on the campaign.  There 
would probably also be numerous “support 
X” and “stop Y” websites and blogs on the 
pros and cons of the candidates.
 
This would not be a truly “democratic” elec-
tion, in that the choice of the Commission 
President would still be made by the Euro-
pean Council and the European Parliament. 
Under the rules in the EU Treaty, the Euro-
pean Council proposes a candidate for the 
Commission President by a qualifi ed-majority 
vote, and there is then a simple majority vote 
in the European Parliament. If the European 
Parliament rejects the nominee of the heads 
of government, they have to propose a new 
candidate. Under these rules, rival candidates 
for the Commission Presidency would make 
it very diffi cult for the heads of government to 
force through candidate which does not have 
the support of a majority in the newly elected 
European Parliament –rather like the Queen 
asking the party leader who commands the 
support of the majority in the House of Com-
mons to form the government. Neither the 
centre-right EPP nor the centre-left PES are 
likely to have a majority of seats after the 
2014 elections. As a result, these two politi-
cal groups will have to offer something to the 
centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe to win their support for an EPP- or 
PES-backed Commission President. The Com-
mission is already a political coalition, but for 
the fi rst time the political deal that constitutes 
this coalition would be transparent.
If a contest of the Commission Presidency in 
2014 really happens, attracts good quality can-
didates, and captures the imagination of the 
European publics, the EU would be transform-
ed. The Commission would be reinvigorat-
ed, and the winning candidate would emerge 
with a mandate to pursue 
policy reform on several 
fronts. There would still 
be all the usual checks and 
balances in the EU, in that 
any policy proposals would 
still have to be approved by 
the national governments 
in the Council as well as 
the European Parliament, 
and decisions would be 
policed by the European 
Court of Justice and national courts. But, for 
the fi rst time since Jacques Delors a signifi -
cant proportion of the public might be able to 
name the person who holds the highest polit-
ical offi ce in the EU, while the people who 
preferred one of the losing candidates might 
even start to engage more with EU politics. 
Finally, the EU would have the injection of 
democratic politics it vitally needs to be able 
The EU has proven to be pretty 
resilient. And it is easy in the midst 
of a crisis to ignore the fact that the 
alternatives to the EU single market 
and the Euro are not very palatable 
for most states 
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to tackle the huge policy challenges facing us 
in the next decade.  
But how likely is this emerging democratic 
politics in the EU?  I would say only about 20 
per cent.  Many European politicians resisted 
a contest for the Commission Presidency in 
2009 and will probably try to stop it happe-
ning again in 2014. After all, the politicians 
who would lose most from this scenario 
would be the prime ministers of Germany and 
France, who try to run the EU from the Eu-
ropean Council.  The last thing they want is a 
Commission President with a rival mandate.
Nevertheless, things might be different in 
2014. First, Barroso was standing for a second 
term in 2009 and so all the sitting prime minis-
ters were reluctant to openly support a rival 
candidate against the person they had been 
doing business with for several years.  In 2014 
there will be a clean slate, and every side will 
be trying to win the highest EU offi ce for one 
of their politicians. Second, in the face of a 
genuine existential crisis of the EU, Europe’s 
leaders might see a more democratic EU as 
the only way to build the legitimacy they need 
for their policy reforms.
The EU is in crisis.  But it is worth saving.  If 
it was scrapped tomorrow, more than 70 per 
cent of it would have to be rebuilt exactly 
as it is.  Our standards of living and our con-
sumption and lifestyle choices are not sus-
tainable without a continental-scale single 
market.  European-level executive, legislative 
and judicial institutions are necessary to go-
vern such a market, while a common set of 
rules and regulations are vital for a market 
to function fairly and effectively. We should 
also not forget that many other regions in the 
world are envious of what Europe has man-
aged to achieve in a relatively short space of 
time. My hope is that Europe’s politicians and 
policy-makers realise this before it is too late. 
There is time to save the EU, and the best way 
to do so is to be more creative about how
to make the EU open and democratic,
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